Attorney Immunity
Attorney immunity bars claims by non-clients against a lawyer for conduct within the scope of representing a client. The Texas Supreme Court calls it an affirmative defense, and whether it protects against suit itself or only against liability remains debated. It turns on the kind of conduct at issue rather than on whether that conduct was wrongful. Texas applies it outside litigation as well as within it.
A lawyer who does a lawyer's job for a client cannot be sued for it by the person on the other side. That is the core of the doctrine. The protection does not depend on the lawyer's motive, and it is not lost because the conduct alleged is fraudulent or otherwise wrongful. The question is functional. Was the lawyer discharging duties owed to a client?
The controlling test
Cantey Hanger, LLP v. Byrd, 467 S.W.3d 477 (Tex. 2015), holds that an attorney is immune from civil liability to non-clients for conduct within the scope of representation, even conduct alleged to be fraudulent. The court rejected a fraud exception. What matters is the kind of conduct, not the wrongfulness of a particular instance of it. Filing a document, negotiating a term or advising on a course of action are things lawyers do for clients, and characterizing one instance as improper does not strip the immunity.
Haynes and Boone, LLP v. NFTD, LLC, 631 S.W.3d 65 (Tex. 2021), extended the doctrine beyond litigation to all adversarial contexts in which a lawyer owes a duty to zealously and loyally represent a client, including business transactions, while making clear the conduct must still be lawyerly in kind. Landry's, Inc. v. Animal Legal Defense Fund, 631 S.W.3d 40 (Tex. 2021), marks the outer edge, since publicity conduct that is not the practice of law does not qualify merely because a lawyer performed it. Bethel v. Quilling, Selander, Lownds, Winslett & Moser, P.C., 595 S.W.3d 651 (Tex. 2020), confirms that criminal conduct is not categorically outside the immunity, though conduct that is criminal will often fall outside the scope of representation anyway.
The business court application
In In re Frank Jackson, No. 15-25-00235-CV (Tex. App.—15th Dist. July 14, 2026), the Fifteenth Court conditionally granted mandamus relief to a lawyer alleged to be general counsel of a company's parent, who had been sued by the company's former chief executive for tortious interference founded on his advice that the board terminate the chief executive. Chief Justice Brister wrote for the court and Justice Farris dissented. Reviewing the denial of a Rule 91a motion, the court held that the petition did not plead facts taking that advice outside the kind of conduct attorneys engage in when discharging professional duties, and it directed the business court to vacate its order and dismiss him. The majority said it was not holding that immunity applied as a matter of law. The opinion also confirms that no express engagement agreement is needed, because Texas does not require a written agreement for legal representation outside the contingent fee context.
For in-house counsel the decision is useful and narrow. Advice to the board on a personnel decision is lawyering. Running the business is not. Justice Farris, dissenting, would have held that the pleaded business-advisor role defeated dismissal under Rule 91a, and she invited the Texas Supreme Court to grant review if a petition is filed.
How it is raised
The defense may be raised by a Rule 91a motion to dismiss when the pleadings establish it, as Bethel held, or by summary judgment, as in Cantey Hanger. Under Cantey Hanger the inquiry looks at the kind of conduct, not the lawyer's motive or the alleged wrongfulness of the act.